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NOTES
DUTY OF THE PROSECUTOR TO CALL WITNESSES
WHOSE TESTIMONY WILL HELP THE ACCUSED
TO ESTABLISH HIS INNOCENCE
The prosecutor, in a criminal case, is not at liberty, like a plaintiff in
a civil case, to select out a part of an entire transaction which makes
[the case] against the defendant, and then, to put the defendant to the
proof of the other part .... The prosecuting officer represents the
public interest, which can never be promoted by the conviction of the
innocent.... [A]ll the witnesses present at the transaction, should be
called by the prosecution, before the prisoner is put to his defense .... I
This statement by the Michigan Supreme Court is one of the earliest recog-
nitions in this country of a duty of the prosecutor to call witnesses whose
testimony may be favorable to the accused. A minority of jurisdictions have
imposed an affirmative duty on the prosecutor to call certain categories of
witnesses to safeguard against the suppression of evidence or to insure fair-
ness to the accused. Other courts, which fail to recognize such an affirma-
tive duty, might grant relief when the failure of the prosecutor to call a wit-
ness results in suppression or other unfairness to the accused.
The imposition of a duty to call witnesses is but one method used by the
courts to assure defendants in criminal cases that all exculpatory evi-
dence will come to the attention of the jury. Thus, the duty to call must be
distinguished from other, related devices aimed at this end. Generally, if
neither the defendant nor the prosecutor knows of certain evidence that
would be helpful to the defendant, the later discovery of such material evi-
dence will result in a reversal of the conviction. This newly discovered evi-
dence remedy, however, is inappropriate when the prosecutor knows of the
existence of exculpatory evidence, but the defendant does not. Under these
circumstances, two other safeguards are available to protect defendants. The
use of discovery procedures may enable a defendant to find out what evi-
dence the prosecutor is going to use against him. Obviously, however, the
prosecutor will not intend to introduce any evidence which will help the de-
fendant's case. More significant to a defendant in this situation is the possi-
ble holding by courts that a suppression of material evidence by the prose-
cutor is a denial of the defendant's right to due process, whether the suppres-
sion involves active concealment or a mere failure to notify. Another avenue
I. Hurd v. People, 25 Mich. 405, 416 (1872).
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chosen by some courts in response to this issue is the one examined by this
note-the imposition on the prosecutor of a duty to call certain witnesses.
After such witnesses are on the stand, the courts must also decide whether
the prosecutor must elicit testimony from them and whether both parties
can use the tools of cross-examination. Clearly, all these devices, which are
designed to bring about the same goal, overlap one another extensively. The
devices other than the duty to call witnesses will be discussed only to clarify
the precise role of the duty to call within the panoply of safeguards for the
protection of a defendant.
If the accused must call a witness to the stand, he is faced with the pro-
cedural handicap imposed by the sponsorship doctrine that prohibits him
from impeaching his own witness.2 His ability to ask leading questions may
be conditioned on a showing that the witness is hostile.' The prosecutor is
given a tactical advantage in that he can impeach the witness for bad
character, which might place a stigma on the accused's defense.' If the ac-
cused can force the prosecutor to call the witness, he avoids all of these
handicaps and gains the right of cross-examination. It will be seen that the
manner in which a court views the role of the prosecutor will largely govern
whether it will relieve the accused of these handicaps. This note examines
the history and current scope of the affirmative duty to call witnesses, ex-
plores reasons for the continuance or elimination of it, and examines recent
attempts to establish it on constitutional grounds.
I. THE. AFmmATw DuTY
At early common law, the accused in a felony case was not permitted
counsel, could not appear as a witness in his own behalf, and could not
compel the attendance of witnesses.5 Presumably in an effort to soften the
rigors of these limitations, a rule evolved in England in the early nineteenth
century that the prosecutor in felony cases was under a duty to call (1) all
eyewitnesses to the offense, and (2) all witnesses whose names were endorsed
on the indictment as having appeared before the grand jury.6 A number of
2. McCoamicx, EVIDENCE § 38 (1954). See generally Note, 49 VA. L. REV. 996
(1963).
3. McCoamica, EVIDENCE § 6 (1954).
4. Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 444 (1963) (concurring opinion); United
States v. Ramsey, 220 F. Supp. 86, 89 (E.D. Tenn. 1963); see MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE
§ 42 (1954); cf. People v. Cleminson, 250 Ill. 135, 95 N.E. 157 (1911).
5. 1 CHrrry, CRmINAL LAw 624-25 (4th ed. 1841); see, e.g., Keller v. State, 123
Ind. 110, 23 N.E. 1138 (1890); State v. Smith, 78 Minn. 362, 81 N.W. 17 (1899);
Hill v. Commonwealth, 88 Va. 633, 14 S.E. 330 (1892).
6. 7 WDmoRz, EVIDENCE § 2079 (3d ed. 1940). It is Professor Wigmore's position
that the rule never achieved the status of a rule of law, but was merely a rule of ethics
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nisi prius decisions embodying the rule' were relied on by American courts
in establishing the duty to call witnesses in this country.,
A. Michigan
Michigan was the first state to recognize the duty, and the bulk of per-
tinent American decisions is found in the Michigan reports. Early Michigan
cases were cited and followed in other jurisdictions9 and that state's decisions
have played a major role in the development of this area of the law. There-
fore, Michigan law will be isolated for an intensive historical and analytical
treatment to serve as a base for the analysis of the duty in other jurisdictions.
The rule as currently stated in Michigan is that the prosecutor must call
every res gestae witness,1" whose testimony will not merely be cumulative, if
calling the witness is reasonably necessary to protect the accused against a
false accusation.11 Without embarking at this point on a detailed discussion
of which witnesses are res gestae witnesses and which of these are reasonably
necessary to protect the accused against a false accusation, it is sufficient to
note that the Michigan Supreme Court in imposing the duty considers the
degree of the offense,12 the number of witnesses available,1" the importance
observed only because of the peculiar relationship between the English bench and bar.
However, he observes that American courts viewed it as a rule of law and therefore,
for the purpose of assessing the prosecutor's duty to call witnesses in this country, the
problem of whether it ever attained that status in England is of no consequence.
7. Regina v. Stroner, 1 Car. & K. 650, 174 Eng. Rep. 976 (N.P. 1845); Regina v.
Holden, 8 Car. & P. 606, 173 Eng. Rep. 638 (N.P. 1837); Regina v. Chapman, 8 Car.
& P. 558, 173 Eng. Rep. 617 (N.P. 1837). For a list of other English cases decided at
nisi prius during this period see 7 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2079 n.1 (3d ed. 1940).
8. The three cases cited in note 7 supra were cited in Maher v. People, 10 Mich.
212 (1862); Morrow v. State, 57 Miss. 836 (1880); Territory v. Hanna, 5 Mont. 248,
5 Pac. 252 (1884).
9. E.g., Territory v. Hanna, supra note 8; State v. McGahey, 3 N.D. 293, 55 N.W.
753 (1893); Hunnicutt v. State, 20 Tex. App. 632 (1886).
10. The term "res gestae witnesses" is used throughout this note to indicate those
witnesses who must be called because they possess knowledge of part of the criminal
transaction. Although this term has come to mean many things, and thus practically
nothing, it was felt that the terminology used by the courts should be employed to avoid
compounding the confusion. For a discussion of the history of the term and its mean-
ings, see 6 Wsmxoa, EVMENCE §§ 1767-69 (3d ed. 1940).
11. People v. Durkee, 369 Mich. 618, 120 N.W.2d 729 (1963); People v. Kayne,
268 Mich. 186, 255 N.W. 758 (1934); see People v. Bartlett, 312 Mich. 648, 20 N.W.2d
758 (1945).
12. E.g., People v. Redman, 250 Mich. 334, 230 N.W. 196 (1930); People v. Kindra,
102 Mich. 147, 60 N.W. 458 (1894); Bonker v. People, 37 Mich. 4 (1877); see People
v. Kayne, supra note 11; People v. Long, 44 Mich. 296, 6 N.W. 673 (1880). For a full
discussion of this issue see notes 41-45 infra and accompanying text.
13. When the number of witnesses is small and the crime is a serious one, the courts
are less likely to excuse the prosecutor's duty to call a given witness on the ground that
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of the testimony the witness may give,14 the relationship of the witness to
the accused, 5 the participation of the witness in the crime for which the
accused is being tried, 16 and the likelihood that the witness will commit
perjury.' Furthermore, when the prosecutor is required to call the witness
as a res gestae witness, he is not required to examine him.1
1. Development of the Duty
The rule finds its origin in dicta in four early cases which held that the
prosecutor is under a duty to present all the evidence of a criminal trans-
action, all of the so-called res gestae, whether the evidence tends to prove
the defendant's guilt or innocence. 9 Thus, not only was the prosecutor
required to satisfy the burden of proving the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt, but he was further required to call witnesses whose testi-
the evidence the witness will give is merely cumulative. See, e.g., People v. Castelli, 370
Mich. 147, 121 N.W.2d 438 (1963); People v. Durkee, 369 Mich. 618, 120 N.W.2d
729 (1963); People v. Burnstein, 261 Mich. 534, 246 N.W. 217 (1933); People v. Mc-
Cullough, 81 Mich. 25, 45 N.W. 515 (1890).
14. See, e.g., People v. Castelli, supra note 13 (the only witness who could contra-
dict the identifying witnesses) ; People v. Burnstein, supra note 13 (apparently the only
witness who saw the perpetrator flee); Thomas v. People, 39 Mich. 309 (1878) (only
unbiased eyewitness at the scene of the assault).
15. For a discussion of relieving the duty when relatives of the accused are witnesses
see text accompanying notes 68-72 infra.
16. For a discussion of excusing witnesses who are alleged accomplices of the accused
see text accompanying notes 61-67 infra.
17. For a discussion of excusing the duty in reference to perjurers see text accom-
panying notes 73-75 infra. That this consideration is the foundation of the exceptions to
the duty to call relatives and accomplices, see text accompanying notes 58-60 infra.
18. People v. Hughes, 116 Mich. 80, 74 N.W. 309 (1898); People v. Deitz, 86 Mich.
419, 49 N.W. 296 (1891); see People v. Pope, 108 Mich. 361, 66 N.W. 213 (1896).
Contra, People v. Hill, 258 Mich. 79, 241 N.W. 873 (1932) (dictum); see Hurd v.
People, 25 Mich. 405 (1872); Maher v. People, 10 Mich. 212 (1862).
19. Strang v. People, 24 Mich. 1, 10 (1871); Patten v. People, 18 Mich. 314
(1869); Brown v. People, 17 Mich. 429, 433-34 (1868); Maher v. People, supra note
18.
[W]henever it may appear evident to the Court, that but a part of the facts, or a
single fact, has been designedly selected by the prosecution from the series consti-
tuting the res gestae, or entire transaction, and that the evidence of the others is
within the power of the prosecutor, it would . . . be the duty of the court to re-
quire the prosecutor to show the transaction as a whole. Id. at 226.
In the Patten case, the court observed: "[I]t was not only the right, but the duty of the
prosecution to show generally the transaction as a whole, its nature and its objects,
whether its tendency should be to show the guilt or innocence of the defendant." Patten
v. People, supra at 327.
In the Strang case, the court, in referring to the circumstances immediately preceding
and following the transaction in question, said that this evidence "was not only admissable,
but it was the plain duty of the prosecution to put it in." Strang v. People, supra at 10.
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mony would weaken his case, despite the fact that these witnesses would
ordinarily have been called by the defendant-at least to the extent that
he was aware of their existence. Consequently, the prosecutor, at this early
stage, was not allowed to present only that evidence which would tend to
pose his case in its strongest light.
The duty focused primarily on the evidence that the prosecutor was
required to produce and only secondarily on the witnesses that he had to
call in doing so.2" Cases then began to emphasize the types of witnesses the
prosecutor was obliged to call in satisfying this duty." When the court
ultimately held that the prosecutor had fulfilled his duty by calling the res
gestae witnesses to the stand and turning them over to the accused for
cross-examination,2' it performed a neat bit of surgery that relieved the
prosecutor of any duty to elicit exculpatory evidence adverse to his case.2"
He is apparently free of any such affirmative duty today, except to the ex-
tent that he faces reversal of a conviction if material evidence fails to come
to the defendant's attention prior to conviction.2" Such evidence is charac-
terized as newly discovered evidence and relief is granted if it is sufficiently
material to have been likely to affect the result of the trial.
Obviously, if the evidence fails to come to light because of a failure to
call a res gestae witness, who was not known to the accused, then reversal
follows because of the failure to meet the requirements of the res gestae
witness rule.2" The newly discovered evidence rule complements the res
20. See Hurd v. People, 25 Mich. 405 (1872); Strang v. People, supra note 19;
Patten v. People, supra note 19; Brown v. People, supra note 19; Maher v. People,
supra note 18.
21. See People v. Etter, 81 Mich. 570, 45 N.W. 1109 (1890) (material witness);
Thomas v. People, 39 Mich. 309 (1878) (eyewitness to an assault with intent to kill);
Wellar v. People, 30 Mich. 16 (1874) (eyewitness to a homicide).
22. People v. Deitz, 86 Mich. 419, 49 N.W. 296 (1891).
23. See, e.g., People v. Hughes, 116 Mich. 80, 74 N.W. 309 (1898); People v. Deitz,
supra note 22.
24. See People v. Ake, 362 Mich. 134, 106 N.W.2d 800 (1961) (court assumed the
prosecutor knew or should have known of the evidence); People v. Parisi, 270 Mich. 429,
259 N.W. 127 (1935) (neither defendant nor prosecutor knew of the evidence).
25. People v. Ake, supra note 24; see People v. Parisi, supra note 24.
26. See People v. Blazenzitz, 212 Mich. 675, 180 N.W. 370 (1920). Although the
court did not hold the witness was a res gestae witness, in a later decision it stated that
the witness in question in the Blazenzitz case was such a witness. People v. Schwartz,
215 Mich. 197, 183 N.W. 723 (1921).
However, if the defendant does know of the existence of the witness he must make a
timely request that the prosecutor be compelled to call the witness or the court may be
reluctant to give relief on appeal. See, e.g., People v. Kynerd, 314 Mich. 107, 22
N.W.2d 90 (1946); People v. Higgins, 127 Mich. 291, 86 N.W. 812 (1901). The de-
fendant cannot sit back and await a verdict or the close of the prosecution's case before
raising an objection to the failure to call the witness. See, e.g., People v. Flynn, 330
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gestae witness requirement when a witness is called by the prosecutor, but
in examination of the witness by the defendant's counsel, material evidence
is not elicited because the defendant was unaware that the witness possessed
it." Consequently, in Michigan, these two rules in combination, rather than
the more widely accepted suppression doctrine, insure defendants that all ex-
culpatory evidence will be brought to their attention; the fact that the
prosecutor's conduct might include some form of suppression is apparently
of no consequence."
2. Endorsement of Res Gestae Witnesses on the Information
It should be noted that the branch of the English rule which required the
calling of all witnesses whose names had been endorsed on the indictment
was never adopted in Michigan. 9 Though court decisions fail to discuss the
Mich. 130, 47 N.W.2d 47 (1951); People v. Kynerd, supra; People v. Greco, 308 Mich.
314, 13 N.W.2d 832 (1944); People v. Kolodzieski, 237 Mich. 654, 212 N.W. 958
(1927). This consideration is not present when the defendant is ignorant of the exist-
ence of the witness. See People v. Blazenzitz, supra.
27. In People v. Ake, 362 Mich. 134, 106 N.W.2d 800 (1961), the court reversed
the conviction of a woman for the murder of her husband. In calling a deputy sheriff
to the stand, the prosecutor failed to elicit evidence that the witness had heard the de-
ceased threaten bodily harm to his wife a short time prior to the killing. Her defense
was self-defense. The defendant became aware of the evidence after the trial, and the
court said the evidence was material enough to support reversal of the conviction. It
was treated as new evidence rather than suppressed testimony. The court accepted the
defendant's contention that the prosecutor knew or should have known of the evidence
at the time of the trial.
28. See People v. Ake, supra note 27; People v. Parisi, 270 Mich. 429, 259 N.W. 127
(1935). But see People v. Blazenzitz, 212 Mich. 675, 180 N.W. 370 (1920).
In the Ake case the court accepted the defendant's contention that the prosecutor
knew or should have known of the existence of the evidence which failed to come to
the attention of the accused until after the trial. In the Parisi case the prosecutor was
apparently as ignorant of the existence of the exculpatory evidence as the accused. Both
convictions were reversed because of newly discovered evidence, the court failing to
differentiate between the two despite the suppression involved in Ake. In the Blazenzitz
case, decided forty-one years earlier than the Ake case, the court strongly criticized the
prosecution's concealment or suppression of the evidence possessed by a witness near the
scene of the crime. Although the cases might be distinguished because in Ake the
prosecutor called the witness but failed to elicit the evidence, while in Blazenzitz he
failed to make known the existence of the witness, the cases seem to conflict. In both
cases the prosecutor failed to disclose evidence. However, in Ake, this failure to dis.
close was not viewed by the court in traditional terms of suppression, but rather in the
context of newly discovered evidence-ignoring considerations of reprehensible conduct
on the part of the prosecutor.
29. As early as Wellar v. People, 30 Mich. 16 (1874), the court said that the en-
dorsement of the witness's name by the prosecutor did not thereby require the prosecu-
tor to call the witness to the stand. E.g., People v. Whitmore, 230 Mich. 435, 203 N.W.
87 (1925); People v. Quick, 51 Mich. 547, 18 N.W. 375 (1884) (per curiam).
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reason for this, the answer may lie in the fact that the rule requiring calling
of res gestae witnesses was at its outset broad enough to effectuate substanti-
ally the apparent purpose of the English rule, that is, a presentation of all
material evidence bearing on the guilt or innocence of the accused." Early
cases indicated that material witnesses must be called even though they were
not eyewitnesses to the criminal transaction."
The Michigan Supreme Court early held that the endorsement of the
name of a witness on the indictment placed only a burden of production
on the prosecutor. 2 The accused then was free to call the witness to the
stand if he chose to do so. Any duty imposed on the prosecutor to call an
endorsed witness to the stand depended on whether the witness could prop-
erly be classified as a res gestae witness. By statute,33 the prosecutor is re-
quired to endorse the names of res gestae witnesses on the information or
indictment. Therefore, the court is often considering the problem of who
must be endorsed side-by-side with the question of who must be called to the
stand by the prosecutor.3 The failure of the court to segregate adequately
these issues has often resulted in confusing and loose language.3
3. Scope and Meaning of the Term "Res Gestae Witness"
In attempting to define the term "res gestae witness," it is necessary to
consider the Michigan Supreme Court's definition in light of the purposes
for the imposition of the duty to call. The court's stated reasons for imposing
the duty are (1) to avoid suppression of evidence favorable to the accused,"
and (2) to protect the accused against a false accusation 7 by giving him the
opportunity, through cross-examination privileges, to elicit exculpatory evi-
30. See Hurd v. People, 25 Mich. 405 (1872); Strang v. People, 24 Mich. 1 (1871);
Patten v. People, 18 Mich. 314 (1869); Maher v. People, 10 Mich. 212 (1862).
31. People v. Etter, 81 Mich. 570, 45 N.W. 1109 (1890); People v. Swetland, 77
Mich. 53, 43 N.W. 779 (1889).
32. E.g., People v. Henshaw, 52 Mich. 564, 18 N.W. 360 (1884); People v. Quick,
51 Mich. 547, 18 N.W. 375 (1884) (per curiamn); Wellar v. People, 30 Mich. 16
(1874).
33. WiH. STAT. ANN. § 28.980 (1954).
34. E.g., People v. Castelli, 370 Mich. 147, 121 N.W.2d 438 (1963); People v.
Kayne, 268 Mich. 186, 255 N.W. 758 (1934); People v. Knoll, 258 Mich. 89, 242
N.W. 222 (1932); People v. Blazenzitz, 212 Mich. 675, 180 N.W. 370 (1920).
35. See, e.g., People v. Castelli, supra note 34 (confusing use of the term "produce");
People v. Van Vorce, 240 Mich. 75, 215 N.W. 5 (1927); People v. Blazenzitz, supra
note 34.
36. People v. Tann, 326 Mich. 361, 40 N.W.2d 184 (1949); People v. Raider, 256
Mich. 131, 239 N.W. 387 (1931); People v. Kindra, 120 Mich. 147, 60 N.W. 458
(1894); Bonker v. People, 37 Mich. 4 (1877).
37. People v. Bartlett, 312 Mich. 648, 20 N.W.2d 758 (1945); People v. Kayne,
268 Mich. 186, 255 N.W. 758 (1934).
Washington University Open Scholarship
PROSECUTOR'S DUTY TO CALL WITNESSES
dence3 A nebulous term at best, res gestae has been defined by the state's
supreme court as the "facts and declarations which grow out of the main
fact, are contemporaneous with it, and serve to illustrate its character."' 9
The term cannot be arbitrarily confined to limits of time and includes "the
facts which so illustrate and characterize the principal fact as to constitute
the whole one transaction, and render the latter necessary to exhibit the
former in its proper effect.""0
In considering the duty to call res gestae witnesses the court is actually
faced with two issues: (1) what categories of witnesses can be properly
characterized as res gestae witnesses, and (2) if a witness falls into such a
category, should the prosecutor be compelled to call the witness in light of
the circumstances of the given case.
Eyewitnesses to homicides,4 ' crimes of violence," and other felonies, 43
are res gestae witnesses. The same is true of eyewitnesses to the flight of the
perpetrator of a felony.4" Eyewitnesses to misdemeanors are not labeled res
gestae witnesses by the court.4' Decisions by the Supreme Court of Michi-
gan differ as to whether a person at the scene who evidently heard, but did
not see, a crime take place is a res gestae witness.46 Those witnesses who can
give particularly material testimony bearing on the guilt or innocence of the
accused have also been designated res gestae witnesses, whether or not the
evidence was directly related to the criminal act.47
38. People v. Raider, 256 Mich. 131, 239 N.W. 387 (1931).
39. People v. Kayne, 268 Mich. 186, 191, 255 N.W. 758, 760 (1934).
40. Id. at 192, 255 N.W. at 760.
41. E.g., People v. Durkee, 369 Mich. 618, 120 N.W.2d 729 (1963) (even though
the witness contended she had no memory of the incident); People v. Hunley, 313
Mich. 688, 21 N.W.2d 923 (1946); People v. Connor, 295 Mich. 1, 294 N.W. 74
(1940); Hurd v. People, 25 Mich. 405 (1872).
42. E.g., People v. Serra, 301 Mich. 124, 3 N.W.2d 35 (1942); People v. Germaine,
101 Mich. 485, 60 N.W. 44 (1894); People v. Kenyon, 93 Mich. 19, 52 N.W. 1033
(1892); Thomas v. People, 39 Mich. 309 (1878); see People v. Hughes, 116 Mich. 80,
74 N.W. 309 (1898).
43. E.g., People v. Kayne, 268 Mich. 186, 255 N.W. 758 (1934); People v. Swet-
land, 77 Mich. 53, 43 N.W. 779 (1889).
44. E.g., People v. Castelli, 370 Mich. 147, 121 N.W.2d 438 (1963) (even though
the witness got only a fleeting glimpse); People v. Burnstein, 261 Mich. 534, 246 N.W.
217 (1933); People v. Blazenzitz, 212 Mich. 675, 180 N.W. 370 (1920). But see Peo-
ple v. Savant, 112 Mich. 297, 70 N.W. 576 (1897) (no sufficient reason to believe the
person seen was perpetrator).
45. E.g., People v. Moore, 155 Mich. 107, 118 N.W. 742 (1908); People v. Kindra,
102 Mich. 147, 60 N.W. 458 (1894).
46. People v. Ake, 362 Mich. 134, 106 N.W.2d 800 (1961) (holding that the witness
was not a res gestae witness); People v. Tann, 326 Mich. 361, 40 N.W.2d 184 (1949)
(required the calling of the witness).
47. E.g., People v. Zabijak, 285 Mich. 164, 280 N.W. 149 (1938) (policeman would
have testified that defendant appeared insane before killing); People v. Etter, 81 Mich.
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It is submitted that all the witnesses discussed above should be classified
as res gestae witnesses; all should be called unless the circumstances of the
case dictate otherwise. A close analysis of the cases leads to the conclusion
that the court in fact operates this way, failing, however, to differentiate
its decision not to require the calling of the witness under the circumstances
from its designation of the witness as res gestae or non res gestae 8 The im-
precise use of the term res gestae witness to cover both issues, i.e., the gen-
eral types of witnesses that should be called and the effect of the particular
circumstances on the calling of the particular witness, has made impossible
a meaningful definition of res gestae witnesses.
4. Witnesses the Prosecutor Is Excused From Calling
Once the witness has been designated a res gestae witness he must be
called unless calling is excused by one of five exceptions to the rule. The
exceptions cover witnesses (1) whose testimony is cumulative; (2) who are
not available; (3) who are accomplices, or (4) close relatives of the accused,
or (5) who are charged with perjury. Not all witnesses who fit into these
categories are excepted, however; the singular characteristics of some cases
may create exceptions to the exceptions.
a. witnesses whose testimony will be cumulative. The prosecutor is not
required to call a witness whose testimony will be cumulative."' The excep-
tion springs from the early cases, when the duty was stated in terms of
presenting the whole transaction."0 When the prosecutor has done so, or, in
terms of the duty as it stands today, when he has presented witnesses from
570, 45 N.W. 1109 (1890) (statutory rape case) (witness would have testified girl was
over age of consent); see People v. Kayne, 268 Mich. 186, 255 N.W. 758 (1934) (doc-
tor who examined alleged fake victim in insurance hoax); People v. Long, 44 Mich.
296, 6 N.W. 673 (1880).
In the Long case, as in others, the court failed to make clear that it is considering
two issues, i.e. whether the witness should be labeled a res gestae witness, and if so must
he be called by the prosecutor. The accused, a 17-year-old boy, stole a wallet at a
music hall. There was evidence, given by a prosecution witness, that the boy's father
searched him, took a gold piece from him and placed it in his pocket. The court up-
held a trial court ruling that the prosecutor need not call the father to the stand. In
doing so, it failed to decide specifically whether the witness was a res gestac witness.
However, in discussing the case later in People v. Kayne, supra, the court held that the
father in Long was a res gestae witness. The court in Long had apparently excused
calling the witness because of the relationship of the father to the accused and the
severity of the crime (theft).
48. See, e.g., People v. Moore, 155 Mich. 107, 118 N.W. 742 (1908); People v.
Kindra, 102 Mich. 147, 60 N.W. 458 (1894).
49. E.g., People v. Raider, 256 Mich. 131, 239 N.W. 387 (1931); People v. Red-
man, 250 Mich. 334, 230 N.W. 196 (1930); Hurd v. People, 25 Mich. 405 (1872).
50. Wellar v. People, 30 Mich. 16 (1874); Hurd v. People, supra note 49.
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whom this evidence can be elicited, he has fulfilled his duty and need not
call those witnesses whose testimony will add nothing new. The danger
that evidence favorable to the accused will be suppressed is no longer
present." Witnesses whose evidence will contradict that of the prosecutor's
other witnesses should not fall within the cumulative exception, though
cases indicate that this is a common plea raised by the prosecutor in attempt-
ing to avoid the duty.52 When the number of witnesses is small or the crime
a serious one, the courts are reluctant to label the testimony of a witness
cumulative.53
b. unavailable witnesses. The prosecutor is excused from calling a res
gestae witness who is unavailable if he has used due diligence to secure
his attendance at the trial." This exception is applicable to persons outside
the jurisdiction of the court,"5 those whose identity is not known to the
prosecutor," or those who cannot attend because of special circumstances.57
This exception is no more than a statement that the prosecutor should not be
held to the performance of a duty which he cannot reasonably fulfill because
of circumstances beyond his control.
51. See People v. Redman, 250 Mich. 334, 230 N.W. 196 (1930). However, one
situation can be hypothesized in which the prosecutor could use the cumulative excep-
tion to great advantage. If several witnesses who possess a particular piece of informa-
tion have experience facing cross-examination, for example, veteran police officers, while
another witness with this information is likely to be easily rattled by vigorous cross-
examination, the prosecutor can choose his most dependable witnesses and claim the
others would be cumulative.
52. E.g., People v. Bartlett, 312 Mich. 648, 20 N.W.2d 758 (1945); People v.
Blazenzitz, 212 Mich. 675, 180 N.W. 370 (1920); Thomas v. People, 39 Mich. 309
(1878).
53. See, e.g., People v. Germaine, 101 Mich. 485, 60 N.W. 44 (1894); People v.
Etter, 81 Mich. 470, 45 N.W. 1109 (1890).
54. People v. Castelli, 370 Mich. 147, 121 N.W.2d 438 (1963); People v. Hunley,
313 Mich. 688, 21 N.W.2d 923 (1946); People v. Serra, 301 Mich. 124, 3 N.W.2d 35
(1942); People v. Zabijak, 285 Mich. 164, 280 N.W. 149 (1938); see People v. Van
Vorce, 240 Mich. 75, 215 N.W. 5 (1927). The Van Vorce case held that a letter to
the commanding officer of police officers who were res gestae witnesses was not sufficient
to satisfy due diligence and that the prosecutor must use subpoenas or other means at
hand to assure attendance. The same requirement was voiced in the Zabijak case,
where there was no showing that the prosecutor had in fact made any attempt
to secure the attendance of the witness. In the Hunley and Serra cases, the court held
that the prosecutor is not required to resort to the statute which can be used to secure
the attendance of witnesses outside the jurisdiction of the court. MicHr. STAT. ANN. §
28.1021 (1954). The court said that only a "reasonable effort" was required and this
did not require use of the statute.
55. See People v. Hunley, supra note 54; People v. Serra, supra note 54.
56. People v. Todaro, 253 Mich. 367, 235 N.W. 185 (1931).
57. See People v. Hossler, 135 Mich. 384, 97 N.W. 754 (1904) (witness was old,
feeble and 50 miles away).
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c. accomplices and relatives. The exceptions for accomplices and close
relatives of the accused are based on the premise that such persons are
biased toward the accused and if necessary may lie to protect him.e Since
they are likely to be actively or willingly participating in his defense," there
is little likelihood that suppression of evidence favorable to the accused will
occur if these witnesses are not called. It is equally unlikely that he will need
the tool of cross-examination to elicit facts favorable to his defense from
them." The cases defining these exceptions indicate a reluctance to allow
any erosion of the prosecutor's duty to call witnesses and, therefore, narrowly
limit the range of these two exceptions.
While the prosecutor has been excused from calling an accomplice jointly
charged61 or a person charged with aiding and abetting the accused in per-
petration of the crime for which he is on trial,62 he has been required to call
a participant not charged," and one who was charged jointly with the ac-
cused in commission of a crime other than the one for which the accused
was on trial.6 The court required the calling of witnesses jointly charged
where evidence showed there was no concert of action," of a witness who
was the willing participant in a crime involving sexual intercourse, 6 and of
an accomplice when there was evidence of entrapment." Apparently, except
in those situations in which the accused and the witness are charged with
participating in the commission of the same offense, their community of in-
58. People v. Raider, 256 Mich. 131, 239 N.W. 387 (1931).
Obviously the exceptions were founded upon the recognized inclination or induce-
ment of those close to the accused, by community of interest in the crime or rela-
tionship, to perjure themselves, if they deem it necessary, in his behalf and the in-
congruity of requiring the prosecution to make such witnesses its own. Id. at
135-36, 239 N.W. at 389.
59. See People v. Long, 44 Mich. 296, 6 N.W. 673 (1880) (father of the accused
actively assisting in his defense).
60. See People v. Raider, 256 Mich. 131, 239 N.W. 387 (1931).
61. E.g., People v. Knoll, 258 Mich. 89, 242 N.W. 222 (1932); People v. Baker, 112
Mich. 211, 70 N.W. 431 (1897); see People v. Considine, 105 Mich. 149, 63 N.W.
196 (1895). Contra, People v. Hill, 236 Mich. 672, 211 N.W. 39 (1926) (dictum).
62. People v. Kennan, 275 Mich. 452, 266 N.W. 468 (1936).
63. People v. Raider, 256 lMich. 131, 239 N.W. 387 (1931); see People v. Kayne,
268 Mich. 186, 255 N.W. 758 (1934) (court acknowledged defendant's guilt if witness
helped perpetrate the crime). Contra, People v. Resh, 107 Mich. 251, 65 N.W. 99
(1895).
In Raider, the court added the further requirement that if the prosecutor charges the
accessory or accomplice, he must do so fairly and with no intent to circumvent the res
gestae witness rule.
64. People v. Tann, 326 Mich. 361, 40 N.W.2d 184 (1949).
65. People v. McCullough, 81 Mich. 25, 45 N.W. 515 (1890).
66. See People v. Elco, 131 Mich. 519, 94 N.W. 1069 (1903) (dictum).
67. People v. Gordon, 40 Mich. 716 (1879).
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terest is not great enough to override the asserted reasons for enforcing the
res gestae witness rule.
Close family ties have served as grounds for excusing the calling of wit-
nemes. The prosecutor was excused from calling the accused's wife, the only
witness to a homicide, even though the defendant had specifically waived
any privilege to object to her being used as a witness against him.68 However,
the court required the prosecutor to call the sister of the accused in a case
of assault with intent to murder in which the victim was her fiance.6" The
circumstances had obviously caused the court to decide that her partisanship
to the accused might be less than in the ordinary brother-sister situation.
The court has excused the calling of a father" and mother7 of the accused
when confronted directly with the problem. Friendship toward the accused
is probably not enough to excuse the duty 2
d. perjurers. In People v. Raider7 the court excused the calling of four al-
leged eyewitnesses to a murder. The four had been defense witnesses at an
earlier trial of another participant. Prior to the Raider trial they had been
charged with perjury in connection with their testimony at the earlier trial.
In excusing the prosecutor from endorsing and calling the witnesses, the
court pointed out that to require the prosecutor to call the witnesses would
be virtually ordering a repetition of the perjury. Declining to lay down a
hard and fast rule for excusing the endorsement and calling of such wit-
nemes, the court held that the trial judge could do so when he was convinced
that the charges were made in good faith, and that the accused is protected
against the suppression of testimony and is not prejudiced in his rights of
crom-examination and to a fair trial. The narrow exception, as laid down in
the Raider case, does not extend to those witnesses in whom the prosecutor
has no faith" or those who have made prior inconsistent statements."
68. People v. Hossler, 135 Mich. 384, 97 N.W. 754 (1904).
69. People v. Germaine, 101 Mich. 485, 60 N.W. 44 (1894).
70. People v. Long, 44 Mich. 296, 6 N.W. 673 (1880). But see People v. Harris, 95
Mich. 87, 54 N.W. 648 (1893).
71. See People v. Ake, 362 Mich. 134, 106 N.W.2d 800 (1961). But see People v.
Harris, supra note 70.
72. See People v. Durkee, 369 Mich. 618, 120 N.W.2d 729 (1963); People v. Burn-
stein, 261 Mich. 534, 246 N.W. 217 (1933). The fact that the witness is hostile to the
prosecutor is never enough to do so. See People v. Hill, 236 Mich. 672, 211 N.W. 39
(1926); People v. Elco, 131 Mich. 519, 94 N.W. 1069 (1903); Wellar v. People, 30
Mich. 16 (1874).
73. 256 Mich. 131, 239 N.W. 387 (1931).
74. See People v. Etter, 81 Mich. 570, 45 N.W. 1109 (1890).
75. People v. Blazenzitz, 212 Mich. 675, 180 N.W. 370 (1920).
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5. Examining the Res Gestae Witness
If the witness is a res gestae witness and his calling has not been excused
by one of the exceptions discussed above, the prosecutor must call him to
the stand and then may either examine him or merely turn him over to the
accused for cross-examination."6 If the prosecutor elects to examine the wit-
ness, he is allowed by statute7l to impeach him as though he were called by
the accused. Evidence introduced to impeach the witness's testimony is not
substantive evidence of the defendant's guilt and goes only to the credibility
of the witness." Even prior to the passage of the statute one case had held
that the prosecutor could impeach witnesses he was required to call.7 The
question whether the prosecutor may call a witness under the res gestae
witness rule and immediately impeach him for past criminal record, bad
character or bias without even attempting to elicit any evidence through
direct examination has not been posed to the courts. While this would seem
to be allowed under a literal reading of the statute, the prosecutor should
not be permitted to do so. Impeachment is designed to challenge the credi-
bility of the witness, and until he has offered some evidence there is no reason
to do so. Therefore any such attack should be restricted to situations in
which the prosecutor has first elicited the evidence on direct examination
or when he is given an opportunity to question the witness on redirect ex-
amination after the witness has been cross-examined by the accused.
Court decisions stress that the accused is entitled to cross-examine the
witness the prosecutor is required to call.s" However, the meaning of "cross-
examination" within the res gestae witness rule is uncertain. In other than
the res gestae witness cases, the opponent in a Michigan court is allowed to
cross-examine on any facts modifying the direct examination,"1 and as to all
facts which explain the effect of the facts of the proponent's case as brought
out on direct examination. He apparently is prohibited from eliciting facts
on cross-examination that apply only to his own case. Obviously, under
76. People v. Hughes, 116 Mich. 80, 74 N.W. 309 (1898); People v. Deitz, 86 Mich.
419, 49 N.W. 296 (1891); see People v. Hossler, 135 Mich. 384, 97 N.W. 754 (1904).
77. Mici. STAT. ANN. § 28.980(1) (1954).
78. People v. Durkee, 369 Mich. 618, 120 N.W.2d 729 (1963).
79. People v. Connor, 295 Mich. 1, 294 N.W. 74 (1940); see People v. Bumstein,
261 Mich. 534, 246 N.W. 217 (1933); People v. Hill, 236 Mich. 672, 211 N.W. 39
(1926).
80. E.g., People v. Raider, 256 Mich. 131, 239 N.W. 387 (1931); People v. Pope,
108 Mich. 361, 66 N.W. 213 (1896); People v. Deitz, 86 Mich. 419, 49 N.W. 296
(1891).
81. 6 WiGMoRE, EVIDENCE §§ 1889-90 (3d ed. 1940). One author suggests that Mich-
igan may be classified with jurisdictions espousing wide-open cross-examination. Mc-
CORMICK, EVIDENCE § 21 n.2 (1954).
82. See 6 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 1889-90 (3d ed. 1940).
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the early form of the res gestae witness rule, i.e., that the prosecutor must
present all the evidence proving the guilt or innocence of the accused, it
made little difference whether cross-examination was confined narrowly to
points brought out on direct examination. However, the question of the
scope of cross-examination becomes critical under the modern res gestae wit-
ness rule, i.e., that the prosecutor must place the witness on the stand and
need not elicit any information. If the prosecutor refuses to examine such
a witness, to what extent may the accused cross-examine him? Since nothing
has been brought out on direct examination, does the witness become the
witness of the accused when "cross-examination" begins? These questions
have not been resolved in the state's courts. In the only case dealing directly
with the point, a majority of the court cannot be found on either side of the
issue.8" If the accused must adopt the witness as his own in eliciting evi-
dence, and must vouch for his credibility, the effectiveness of the res gestae
witness rule is curtailed. The accused will have gained no more from the
imposition of the res gestae witness rule than the shifting to the prosecutor
of the burden of locating and securing the attendance of witnesses. A more
reasonable interpretation of the scope of cross-examination in light of the res
gestae witness rule is found in the reasons for imposing the rule and the
general tenor of Michigan cases. The rule is imposed (1) to avoid suppres-
sion of evidence favorable to the accused and (2) to protect the accused
against a false accusation by giving him the opportunity through cross-ex-
amination to elicit exculpatory evidence.14 Apparently the court intends
that the accused shall have the tools of cross-examination at his disposal, i.e.,
that he should be relieved of the procedural handicaps encountered by the
party who calls the witness to the stand, and that he should be allowed
to ask leading questions."5 The res gestae witness rule would seem to require
83. People v. Lummis, 260 Mich. 170, 244 N.W. 438 (1932). The witnesses in ques-
tion had been endorsed on the information and were called by the prosecutor at the
defendant's request. The prosecutor then turned the witnesses over to the defense, with-
out examining them. The trial court ruled that in questioning the witnessses the ac-
cused made them his witnesses. Two judges held, on appeal, that the ruling was correct.
Three others said that the trial court's ruling was erroneous but not prejudicial. Three
other judges felt the conviction should be reversed on other grounds and did not
specifically deal with this problem in their opinion. It is significant that the court failed
to decide specifically whether the witnesses were in fact res gestae witnesses. If they
were not, then there would be no reason to depart from the principle that in question-
ing a witness on matters not brought out by the opponent he becomes the witness of the
party eliciting the evidence. See MCCORmIcx, EVmENCE § 38 n.5 (1954).
84. E.g., People v. Kayne, 268 Mich. 186, 255 N.W. 758 (1934); People v. Raider,
256 Mich. 131, 239 N.W. 387 (1931).
85. See, e.g., People v. Raider, supra note 84; People v. Hughes, 116 Mich. 80, 74
N.W. 309 (1898); People v. Deitz, 86 Mich. 419, 49 N.W. 296 (1891). The most
logical interpretation of the principle of the cases is that the accused may examine the
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that the accused be allowed to deal with the witness as though he were a wit-
ness for the prosecutor. In light of the latitude accorded the prosecutor, pre-
sumably to place him on an even footing with the accused in dealing with
the witness he is required to call, any other interpretation would seem un-
warranted.
B. Scope of The Affirmative Duty in Other Jurisdictions
Because of the lack of a large body of case law outside Michigan, it is
difficult to define the extent of the duty in other jurisdictions. The courts, in
enunciating an affirmative duty, take one of five approaches.
1. Requiring the Calling of All Witnesses Possessing Any Evidence of the
Crime
Broad statements of a duty are found in Vermont"0 and Connecticut87
cases indicating that the prosecutor is under a duty to call all witnesses who
can shed light on the guilt or innocence of the accused. This would seem to
require the calling of a broad spectrum of witnesses in homicide, felony or
even misdemeanor cases, and, in effect, to relieve the accused from calling
any witnesses in the case. However, the statements must be taken at less
than face value in light of decisions holding that the failure to comply with
this duty is not in itself grounds for reversal of a conviction.8 The cases
indicate that the prosecutor need not call witnesses whose testimony will
be cumulative," and a Vermont case stated that the court would not re-
quire the calling of a witness of particularly bad character."0 Therefore,
while the duty, on its face, would seem to be broader in these two states than
in Michigan, the lack of any sanctions against the prosecutor for failure to
comply leaves considerable doubt as to whether the rule rises much above a
statement of ethics.
witness on any point and may treat him as though he were cross-examining him, that is
he may ask leading questions and impeach him.
86. State v. Teitle, 117 Vt. 190, 90 A.2d 562 (1952); State v. Searles, 108 Vt. 236,
184 Ad. 701 (1936); State v. Slack, 69 Vt. 486, 38 Atl. 311 (1897); State v. Harrison,
66 Vt. 523, 29 At. 807 (1894); State v. Magoon, 50 Vt. 330 (1877).
87. State v. Zinnaruk, 128 Conn. 124, 20 A.2d 613 (1941); State v. Jacowitz, 128
Conn. 40, 20 A.2d 470 (1941) ; State v. Guilfoyle, 109 Conn. 124, 145 Atl. 761 (1929);
State v. Dayton, 23 Conn. Supp. 272, 181 A.2d 274 (App. Div. 1962).
88. See State v. Smith, 71 Vt. 331, 45 At. 219 (1899); State v. Roberts, 63 Vt.
139, 21 Atl. 424 (1891); State v. Dayton, supra note 87. The Smith case indicates that
an inference arises against a party failing to call a witness peculiarly within his control.
The Roberts case indicates that the failure must result in violation of a legal right of the
accused.
89. See State v. Roberts, supra note 88; State v. Dayton, supra note 87.
90. See State v. Roberts, supra note 88 (witness so disreputable that calling him
would be a farce).
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2. Requiring the Calling of Witnesses Possessing the Most Direct Evidence
In Montana the prosecutor cannot resort to circumstantial evidence in a
felony case when there are witnesses available who can give direct evidence
concerning the crime.9 He has been required to call some eyewitnesses to a
felony." The question of whether the entire res gestae has been presented is
only a consideration in determining whether the prosecutor should be re-
quired to do more after fulfilling the initial burden of presenting the most
direct evidence.93 Sanctions are applied in this state; the failure to comply
with these requirements has caused reversals of convictions.9" Therefore, in
actual practice, the rule may come closest to approximating the law of Mich-
igan in that a broad spectrum of witnesses fall within the purview of the
rule. 5 However, it lacks the force of the Michigan rule. Montana requires
only that some of the witnesses who possess the most direct evidence be
placed on the stand, while Michigan requires the calling of an important
witness whether or not others with as direct evidence have been called.9"
It should be noted, however, that the prosecutor in Montana is apparently
required to examine the witnesses that he calls,97 while the prosecutor in
91. State v. Metcalf, 17 Mont. 417, 43 Pac. 182 (1896); State v. Vandervoort 57
Mont. 540, 189 Pac. 764 (1920) (dictum); State v. Rolla, 21 Mont. 582, 55 Pac. 523
(1898) (dictum).
92. See State v. Inich, 55 Mont. 1, 173 Pac. 230 (1918); State v. Rolla, supra note
91; State v. Bloor, 20 Mont. 574, 52 Pac. 611 (1898). The duty does not extend to
misdemeanor cases. State v. Parr, 129 Mont. 175, 283 P.2d 1086 (1955).
The prosecutor was relieved of the duty to call all eyewitnesses to a homicide by
MONT. REv. CODES ANN. 94-7213 (1947), which provides: "Upon a trial for murder or
manslaughter it is not necessary for the state to call as witnesses all persons who are
shown to have been present at the homicide, but the court may require all of such wit-
neses to be sworn and examined." The statute was first cited in State v. Rolla, supra
note 91, as Pen. Code § 2082 (1895). This is apparently the only instance in which
legislative enactment has played any part in establishing or limiting the duty of the
prosecutor to call witnesses whose testimony may be of assistance to the accused in
establishing his innocence.
93. See State v. Rolla, supra note 91.
94. State v. Metcalf, 17 Mont. 417, 43 Pac. 182 (1896) (heard shot but did not see
the murder). In Territory v. Hanna, 5 Mont. 248, 5 Pac. 250 (1884) the court re-
versed a conviction for failure to call an eyewitness to a homicide.
95. See State v. Inich, 55 Mont. 1, 173 Pac. 230 (1918) (some eyewitnesses to a
homicide); State v. Metcalf, supra note 94. Obviously the type of witnesses to be called
depends upon the evidence available. If there are no eyewitnesses, a person who heard
the crime committed must be called, as in the Metcalf case. Presumably, if no witness
saw or heard the crime committed, it would be necessary to call one who saw a person
fleeing from the scene. For the spectrum of witnesses to be called under the Michigan
rule see text accompanying notes 41-47 supra.
96. Compare State v. Inich, supra note 95, with People v. Castelli, 370 Mich. 147,
121 N.W.2d 438 (1963).
97. See State v. Metcalf, 17 Mont. 417, 43 Pac. 182 (1896).
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Michigan is not."8 The prosecutor in Montana has been excused from call-
ing an accomplice whom he believed would lie to protect the accused."
3. Requiring the Calling of some Eyewitnesses to a Homicide
In Mississippi the prosecutor is held to a narrower duty than that im-
posed in Montana or Michigan in that he is required only to call some eye-
witnesses to a homicide.' The trial court has the discretion to compel the
prosecutor to call witnesses in trials of other felonies.' Sanctions, in the
form of a reversal of the conviction, may follow a failure to comply with the
duty.0 2 The importance of the duty in this state is indicated by the refusal
to excuse the prosecutor from calling an accomplice." 3
98. People v. Hughes, 116 Mich. 80, 74 N.W. 309 (1898); People v. Deitz, 86 Mich.
419, 49 N.W. 296 (1891); see People v. Hossler, 135 Mich. 384, 97 N.W. 754 (1904).
99. State v. Vandervoort, 57 Mont. 540, 189 Pac. 764 (1920). The court said that
it would refuse to require the calling of an accomplice, jointly charged or not, if by
false swearing he would injure the prosecutor's case. The witness was the brother of the
accused.
The Montana Supreme Court has, however, shown reluctance to extend the range of
exceptions. It required the prosecutor to call a witness he claimed was "stupidly drunk"
at the time of the crime. State v. Metcalf, 17 Mont. 417, 43 Pac. 182 (1896).
100. Ross v. State, 185 Miss. 438, 188 So. 295 (1939); Morrow v. State, 57 Miss.
836 (1880); see Mitchell v. State, 171 Miss. 4, 156 So. 654 (1934); Patty v. State,
126 Miss. 94, 88 So. 498 (1921). Whether or not the prosecutor has presented the res
gestae or whole transaction is a factor considered by the court in determining whether to
require him to do more after he has satisfied his initial duty. Mitchell v. State, supra; see
Sullivan v. State, 213 Miss. 14, 56 So. 2d 93 (1952).
101. See Carlisle v. State, 73 Miss. 387, 19 So. 207 (1896). The court's approach
is similar to that taken in cases cited note 136 infra, dealing with those states which
have no affirmative duty to call witnesses but give the trial court discretion to compel
the prosecutor to call witnesses.
102. Ross v. State, 185 Miss. 438, 188 So. 295 (1939); Mitchell v. State, 171 Miss.
4, 156 So. 654 (1934); see Patty v. State, 126 Miss. 94, 88 So. 498 (1921).
A possible source of confusion in the reversals of some convictions in this state is the
application to homicide cases of a peculiar best evidence rule. If the defendant and his
witness were the only eyewitnesses to the homicide, their version of the incident must be
taken as true unless it is materially contradicted by the physical facts or facts of com-
mon knowledge. Lockridge v. State, 172 So. 2d 192 (Miss. 1965); Weathersby v. State,
165 Miss. 207, 147 So. 481 (1933); Patty v. State, supra. In none of these cases did
the accused request that the prosecutor call some witness. The Patty case, in which this
best evidence rule was apparently formulated, illustrates the way the two rules actually
seem to complement each other. The defendant, the deceased's wife, and another wo-
man were present at the killing. The state proved its case by calling a witness who
heard but did not see the shot, and by introducing a statement made by the defendant.
The accused called the other woman to the stand and she corroborated his contention
of self-defense. The court said that the failure of the state to call the deceased's wife
was a circumstance favorable to the accused, and that his statements and those of his
eyewitness must be taken as true. As in the other Mississippi cases, the court clearly
indicated that the prosecutor should have called the eyewitness even though no rt/quest
Washington University Open Scholarship
PROSECUTOR'S DUTY TO CALL WITNESSES
4. Requiring the Prosecutor to Present the Res Gestae
Cases in five jurisdictions, many decided near the turn of the century,
state that the prosecutor is under a duty to present the entire res gestae. °"0
They parallel the approach of early Michigan cases. 1 ' The fact that most
of these statements are dicta, coupled with the lack of recent decisions in
most of these jurisdictions, casts doubt on the continued vitality of the rule
there.1" The failure to comply with the duty apparently has not resulted in
the application of a sanction in any of these jurisdictions.07 Among the
reasons recognized by these courts for excusing the calling of a witness were
that he had proved himself unreliable,0 ' that he had been unavailable," 9
and that his evidence would have been cumulative."10
5. Adopting the Michigan Rule
Only one case has been found in which a court has adopted the Michigan
rule. A federal district court in Alaska adopted the rule by way of dictum"'
in allowing the prosecutor to impeach a witness he had called to the stand.
None of the states imposing an affirmative duty to call witnesses requires
to do so had been made by the defendant. The court could have reversed on this
ground and ordered a new trial. Instead, the reversal was based on the failure of the
prosecutor to rebut the evidence of the defendant and his eyewitness. Since the state had
failed to sustain its burden of proof, the conviction was dismissed.
103. Mitchell v. State, supra note 102 (the only eyewitness to a homicide). In a
seduction case the court refused to require the calling of the victim, whom the court
viewed as an accomplice. Carlisle v. State, 73 Miss. 387, 19 So. 207 (1896).
104. E.g., State v. Rice, 7 Idaho 762, 66 Pac. 87 (1901); Johnson v. State, 88 Neb.
328, 129 N.W. 281 (1911); State v. McGahey, 3 N.D. 293, 55 N.W. 753 (1893); State
v. Kapelino, 20 S.D. 591, 108 N.W. 335 (1906); People v. Robinson, 6 Utah 101, 21 Pac.
403 (1889) ; see Texter v. State, 170 Neb. 426, 102 N.W.2d 655 (1960).
105. Strang v. People, 24 Mich. 1, 10 (1871); Patten v. People, 18 Mich. 314, 327
(1869); Brown v. People, 17 Mich. 429, 433-34 (1868); Maher v. People, 10 Mich.
212, 226 (1862).
106. Cases cited note 104 supra.
107. See State v. Bounds, 74 Idaho 136, 258 P.2d 751 (1953); State v. Allen, 54
Idaho 459, 34 P.2d 45 (1934); PIessman v. State, 130 Neb. 758, 266 N.W. 629 (1936);
State v. Nuzum, 58 S.D. 6, 234 N.W. 665 (1931).
108. Argabright v. State, 62 Neb. 402, 87 N.W. 146 (1901); see State v. McGahey,
3 N.D. 293, 55 N.W. 753 (1893).
109. People v. Oliver, 4 Utah 460, 11 Pac. 612 (1886).
110. See State v. Bounds, 74 Idaho 136, 258 P.2d 751 (1953) ; Johnson v. State, 88
Neb. 328, 129 N.W. 281 (1911); State v. McGahey, 3 N.D. 293, 55 N.W. 753 (1893);
State v. Nuzum, 58 S.D. 6, 234 N.W. 665 (1931); People v. Robinson, 6 Utah 101, 21
Pac. 403 (1889). The exception for cumulative evidence is inherent in a rule which
requires the prosecutor to present the res gestae. Obviously, once he has fulfilled the
duty he is under no obligation to continue to repeat the process by calling additional
witnesses who can add nothing new. See Hurd v. People, 25 Mich. 405 (1872).
111. Meeks v. United States, 179 F.2d 319 (9th Cir. 1950).
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that witnesses endorsed on the information or indictment be called by the
prosecutor,'12 except to the extent that the witness falls within the category
of witnesses that must be called if his name were not endorsed." 3
C. An Appraisal
In Michigan, the duty places an important tactical tool in the hands of
the accused by giving him the right to cross-examine witnesses he would
otherwise have to call to the stand. This relieves him of procedural handi-
caps usually faced by a party calling a witness and presumably helps him
to elicit evidence that might not otherwise come to light."' The tool is
particularly effective when coupled with the companion rule that material
evidence, which the prosecutor may have concealed from the defendant, will
be treated as new evidence. Thus, even if the witness possessing the evidence
was placed on the stand by the prosecutor, the conviction will be reversed if
the material evidence is not introduced."' The fact that the prosecutor is
allowed latitude in dealing with the witness he is compelled to call"' miti-
gates any unfair advantage which the accused might otherwise realize from
a shift in the roles of the opposing parties in the criminal trial. The res
gestae witness rule can be criticized for being too nebulous to provide a
usable guide to the prosecutor in determining which witnesses must be
called." 7 On the other hand, this lack of certainty allows flexibility in ad-
ministering the rule. The court has considerable discretion to compel or
excuse the calling of the witness in light of the circumstances of the case." 8
Despite its lack of certainty in application, the Michigan rule is preferable
to a rigid rule which requires the calling of limited categories of witnesses,"'
112. E.g., State v. Allen, 54 Idaho 459, 34 P.2d 45 (1934); People v. Whitmore,
230 Mich. 435, 203 N.W. 87 (1925) ; State v. Russell, 13 Mont. 164, 32 Pac. 854 (1893) ;
Bloom v. State, 95 Neb. 710, 146 N.W. 965 (1914); State v. Ave, 74 N.D. 242, 21
N.W.2d 352 (1946); see People v. Oliver, 4 Utah 460, 11 Pac. 612 (1886).
113. See, e.g., State v. Rice, 7 Idaho 762, 66 Pac. 87 (1901); People v. Kayne, 268
Mich. 186, 255 N.W. 758 (1934); State v. Rolla, 21 Mont. 582, 55 Pac. 523 (1898);
Johnson v. State, 88 Neb. 328, 129 N.W. 281 (1911); People v. Oliver, supra note 112.
114. See People v. Raider, 256 Mich. 131, 135, 239 N.W. 387, 389 (1931).
115. People v. Ake, 362 Mich. 134, 106 N.W.2d 800 (1961).
116. MAicr. STAT. ANN. § 28.980(1) (1954).
117. Compare People v. Ake, 362 Mich. 134, 106 N.W.2d 800 (1961), with People
v. Tann, 326 Mich. 361, 40 N.W.2d 184 (1949).
118. Compare People v. Castelli, 370 Mich. 147, 121 N.W.2d 438 (1963), and
People v. Burnstein, 261 Mich. 534, 246 N.W. 217 (1933), and Thomas v. People, 39
Mich. 309 (1878), with People v. Ake, supra note 117, and People v. Kennan, 275
Mich. 452, 266 N.W. 468 (1936), and People v. Long, 44 Mich. 296, 6 N.W. 673
(1880).
119. In Mississippi the prosecutor must call some eyewitnesses to a homicide. Cases
cited note 100 supra. At common law the prosecutor had a duty to call all eyewitnesses
to felonies and all endorsed witnesses. Cases cited note 7 supra.
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or a rule based on the directness of the evidence the witness can give. °
The shortcoming of these latter rules is that they may exclude a witness who
poseses more important exculpatory evidence than the witness whom the
rule requires the prosecutor to call. Both lack the flexibility to meet the
needs of the defendant in all cases.
A rule that places a duty on the prosecutor to introduce all the evidence
establishing the guilt or innocence of the accused, 21 or that requires the
prosecutor to call all witnesses who can shed any light on the case,122 would
work a fundamental change in the adversary nature of the criminal trial.
Such a solution might seriously hamper the prosecutor in securing convic-
tions of the guilty. The lack of sanctions in states espousing such rules leaves
the adversary nature of the criminal trial intact and renders the rules little
more than ethical guidelines for the prosecutor. 22
Unlike Michigan, some states imposing an affirmative duty have failed
to give the prosecutor a free hand in dealing with witnesses he is required
to call.2 ' Thus, in relieving the defendant of the procedural handicaps in-
herent in calling a witness the courts have merely shifted them to the prose-
cutor. The prosecutor who is required to place a witness on the stand whom
he would not choose to call if he had a completely unrestricted discretion,
should be allowed substantial latitude in dealing with the witness to insure
120. In Montana the prosecutor cannot use circumstantial evidence if witnesses are
available who can give direct evidence. Cases cited notes 91-92 supra.
121. Scattered older decisions in several jurisdictions state that the prosecutor has a
duty to present the entire criminal transaction. Cases cited note 104 supra.
122. In Connecticut and Vermont the cases contain statements suggesting the exist-
ence of a very broad duty to call all witnesses who can shed light on the question of
guilt. Cases cited notes 86-87 supra.
123. In none of these states can decisions be found reversing convictions because of
a failure to comply with these broad statements of duty. Cases cited notes 88, 107
supra.
124. Connecticut: The prosecutor may not impeach the witnesses he calls, but is free
to introduce contradictory testimony and the jury is free to decide which version of the
transaction is true. State v. Guilfoyle, 109 Conn. 124, 145 Atl. 761 (1929).
Mississippi: See Dodd v. State, 88 Miss. 50, 40 So. 545 (1906) (trial judge has
discretion to allow latitude in handling); Dunk v. State, 84 Miss. 452, 36 So. 609 (1904)
(prosecutor cannot contradict witness unless trapped into calling him); Chism v. State,
70 Min. 742, 12 So. 852 (1893).
Montana: MONT. REv. CoDEs ANN. 93-1901-8 (1947), provides that the party calling a
witness may not impeach him for bad character but may contradict him by other evidence
or by showing that he has made inconsistent statements at other times. The prosecutor has
been allowed to cross-examine witnesses whose testimony varied from that which the
prosecutor had reason to believe he would give. State v. Bloor, 20 Mont. 574, 52 Pac. 611
(1898). The prosecutor also has been allowed to impeach hostile witnesses. State v.
Willette, 46 Mont. 326, 127 Pac. 1013 (1912). But see State v. Rolla, 21 Mont. 582, 55
Pac. 523 (1898).
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that a less than truthful witness will be exposed. Normally the opponent
has this role, but it is evident that the accused will not attack the veracity
of such a witness.
The existence of the duty, coupled with court decisions allowing the im-
peachment of witnesses the prosecutor is required to call, 2 ' actually works as
an advantage to the prosecutor in Vermont. By contending that he is under
a duty to call all witnesses who can shed light on the guilt or innocence of
the accused, the prosecutor gains the privilege of being allowed to impeach
the witness as though he had been called by the accused."' 0 If these witnesses
are in sympathy with the prosecutor, or would not have been inclined to
favor the accused, the prosecutor has obtained an advantage to which he is
not entitled. Apparently the prosecutor may disregard the duty when he
does not wish to call a witness and the failure to do so will not result in
reversal.2
II. THE POSITION OF THE MAJORITY OF JURISDICTIONS
No affirmative duty to call witnesses has been recognized in the great
majority of jurisdictions. However, judicial statements on this issue range
from declarations that the prosecutor has absolute freedom in selecting wit-
nesses to opinions emphasizing fairness or safeguards imposed to insure a
fair trial. These opinions reflect each court's basic conception of the role of
the prosecutor in the criminal trial. Those courts which view the prosecutor
as a partisan advocate are unwilling to interfere with his discretion, while
those viewing him as a minister of justice apply some safeguards, short of
imposing an affirmative duty, to insure fairness to the accused.
At one extreme are the courts which emphasize the adversary nature of a
trial, and view the prosecutor as a partisan advocate. These courts give the
prosecutor a free hand in choosing and calling witnesses, 28 sometimes reject-
125. State v. Slack, 69 Vt. 486, 38 At. 311 (1897) (can impeach the witness
called); see State v. LaBonte, 120 Vt. 465, 144 A.2d 792 (1958). The LaBonte case
stated that the prosecutor is not bound by the evidence he introduces and may bring forth
other evidence contradicting it.
126. State v. Slack, supra note 125.
127. See State v. Smith, 71 Vt. 331, 45 At. 219 (1899); State v. Roberts, 63 Vt. 139,
21 At!. 424 (1891).
128. Arizona: Halderman v. Territory, 7 Ariz. 120, 60 Pac. 876 (1900); see State v.
Jordan, 83 Ariz. 248, 320 P.2d 446 (1958).
Georgia: See Harper v. State, 131 Ga. 771, 63 S.E. 339 (1909); Greeson v. State, 97
Ga. App. 245, 102 S.E.2d 503 (1958); Cole v. State, 86 Ga. App. 770, 72 S.E.2d 537
(1952); Lee v. State, 2 Ga. App. 481, 58 S.E. 676 (1907).
Louisiana: The court has rejected any duty to call all eyewitnesses to a homicide. State
v. Wiebelt, 166 La. 836, 118 So. 38 (1928); State v. Williams, 30 La. Ann. 842 (1878).
There is no requirement that all those announced as state witnesses be called. See State
v. McKee, 170 La. 630, 128 So. 658 (1930). Also, there is no duty that those subpoenaed
Washington University Open Scholarship
PROSECUTOR'S DUTY TO CALL WITNESSES
ing any authority in the trial judge to interfere in any way." 9 Older opinions
indicate that it is possible for the prosecutor to go too far and abuse his
discretion," '0 and one allows the jury to draw inferences against the prosecu-
tor from his failure to call a witness.'
Six state courts, while rejecting the common law duty to call all eyewit-
nesses or all witnesses endorsed on the indictment or information,"' have not
indicated whether they give the prosecutor absolute discretion, or require the
calling of some witnesses in certain situations.
A large group of courts, while giving a very broad discretion to the prose-
cutor, add language indicating their cognizance of an outer limit on this dis-
cretion. These limits are usually couched in terms of a general prohibition
of suppression of evidence,"' or a requirement that the prosecutor not act
by the prosecutor be called. State v. Stickney, 167 La. 1050, 120 So. 853 (1929). The
prosecuting officer need only call those witnesses he deems necessary to prove his case.
State v. Nejin, 140 La. 793, 74 So. 103 (1917) ; cf. State v. Jones, 233 La. 775, 98 So.
2d 185 (1957).
Massachusetts: A prosecuting officer is violating no canon of legal ethics in presenting
evidence which tends to show guilt, while failing to call witnesses, in whom he has no
confidence, whose testimony contradicts what he is trying to prove. Commonwealth v.
Sacco, 259 Mass. 128, 141, 156 N.E. 57, 61, cert. denied, 275 U.S. 574 (1927); see Com-
monwealth v. Cox, 327 Mass. 609, 100 N.E.2d 14 (1951); Commonwealth v. Haskell, 140
Mass. 128, 2 N.E. 773 (1885).
North Carolina: State v. Terry, 173 N.C. 761, 92 S.E. 154 (1917); State v. Lucas, 124
N.C. 825, 32 S.E. 962 (1899); State v. Martin, 24 N.C. 101 (1841).
Texas: E.g., Keeton v. State, 132 Tex. Crim. 644, 106 S.W.2d 719 (1937) (no duty to
call victim) ; Berrian v. State, 85 Tex. Crim. 367, 212 S.W. 509 (1919) (not bound to
call any or all eyewitnesses to homicide); see Scott v. State, 19 Tex. Ct. App. R. 325
(1885).
West Virginia: State v. Cain, 20 W. Va. 679 (1882).
129. Halderman v. Territory, supra note 128; State v. Martin, supra note 128; State
v. Cain, supra note 128.
130. See State v. Baxter, 82 N.C. 602 (1880).
131. State v. Smallwood, 75 N.C. 104 (1876). Contra, State v. Nein, 140 La. 793,
74 So. 103 (1917).
132. Alabama: See Mann v. State, 134 Ala. 1, 32 So. 704 (1902).
Kentucky: Porter v. Commonwealth, 145 Ky. 548, 140 S.W. 643 (1911).
Maryland: Franklin v. State, 239 Md. 645, 212 A.2d 279 (1965); Matthews v. State,
237 Md. 384, 206 A.2d 714 (1965).
Nevada: State v. Milosovich, 42 Nev. 263, 175 Pac. 139 (1918).
Oklahoma: Hood v. State, 80 Okla. Crim. 175, 157 P.2d 918 (1945); Abrams v. State,
49 Okla. Crim. 376, 293 Pac. 1116 (1930); Pollock v. State, 26 Okla. Crim. 196, 223
Pac. 210 (1924).
South Carolina: State v. Clark, 4 Strob. 311 (1850) (dissent on res gestae by two
judges).
133. Indiana: The prosecutor must only refrain from doing anything that will deprive
the accused of testimony to which he is rightfully entitled. Keller v. State, 123 Ind.
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unfairly."3' A few jurisdictions single out fraud or trickery on the part of the
prosecutor for condemnation, emphasizing that he should never knowingly
seek the conviction of an innocent man.135
110, 23 N.E. 1138 (1890). There is no duty to call all eyewitnesses, Winsett v. State, 57
Ind. 26 (1877).
New York: People v. Fisher, 23 Misc. 2d 391, 192 N.Y.S.2d 741 (N.Y. County Ct. 1958),
and People v. Hoffner, 208 Misc. 117, 129 N.Y.S.2d 833 (Queens County Ct. 1952),
suggest that there is only a duty not to suppress evidence. However, People v. Riley, 191
Misc. 888, 83 N.Y.S.2d 281 (Kings County Ct. 1948), indicates that the prosecutor is
under a duty to present all the material evidence of which he may become possessed.
That rule is reiterated in People v. Buckley, 44 Misc. 2d 403, 253 N.Y.S.2d 967 (Eric
County Ct. 1964) (dictum). Early court cases had held that the prosecutor was under no
duty to call all witnesses endorsed on the indictment or all eyewitnesses to the crime.
People v. Goldberg, 125 App. Div. 429, 109 N.Y.S. 906 (1908); People v. Fitzpatrick,
5 Parker's N.Y. Crim. 26 (Sup. Ct. 1857).
Oregon: In State v. Barrett, 33 Ore. 194, 54 Pac. 807 (1898), the court said that if the
prosecutor tries to suppress evidence the trial judge should require him to bring it forth
even though adverse to the state. Refusal to do this would be grounds for reversal. In
a later case, State v. Sing, 114 Ore. 267, 229 Pac. 921 (1924), the court said there was
no duty to call a witness endorsed on the indictment.
Wyoming: In Ross v. State, 8 Wyo. 351, 57 Pac. 924 (1899), the court said that it might
become the duty of the trial court to force the prosecutor to call a witness if there were
any attempt by the prosecutor to prejudice the accused by suppression of testimony. The
case specifically repudiates the common-aw duty of calling all eyewitnesses.
134. California: E.g., People v. Tuthill, 31 Cal. 2d 92, 187 P.2d 16 (1947), cert.
denied, 335 U.S. 846 (1948); People v. Larrios, 220 Cal. 236, 30 P.2d 404 (1934)
(prosecutor not required to call party he will not vouch for); People v. Ruiz, 228 Cal.
App. 2d 703, 39 Cal. Rptr. 641 (Dist. Ct. App. 1964).
Colorado: Ware v. People, 76 Colo. 38, 230 Pac. 123 (1924) (prosecutor need only act
in good faith). The prosecutor has discretion in calling witnesses. See, e.g., Warren v.
People, 121 Colo. 118, 213 P.2d 381 (1949); Militello v. People, 95 Colo. 519, 37 P.2d
527 (1934).
Missouri: The state is under no obligation to place any person on the witness stand, but
the prosecutor is not at liberty to act in a way fundamentally unfair to the accused. State
v. Eaton, 302 S.W.2d 866 (Mo. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 912 (1958). The state
does not have to call all eyewitnesses to a murder. E.g., State v. Kinne, 372 S.W.2d 62
(Mo. 1963); State v. David, 131 Mo. 380, 33 S.W. 28 (1895).
New Mexico: Thomason v. Territory, 4 N.M. (4 Gild., E.W.S. ed.) 150, 13 Pac. 223
(1887).
135. Iowa: There is no affirmative duty on the prosecutor to call witnesses, only a
negative duty requiring him not purposely to omit to prove any fact in a homicide. See
State v. Christ, 189 Iowa 474, 177 N.W. 54 (1920). Nor may he knowingly ask the con-
viction of an innocent man. State v. Dillon, 74 Iowa 653, 38 N.W. 525 (1888).
Kansas: The prosecutor must only perform his duty fairly and not seek to convict an
innocent man. This means that he may not conceal facts which would establish the
accused's innocence or employ trickery to convict anyone. State v. Campbell, 73 Kan.
688, 720, 85 Pac. 784, 795 (1906).
Tennessee: The prosecutor should not be forced to introduce any particular witness in
presenting his case, but the trial court can compel calling if a trick or fraud has been
practiced or if the prosecutor has prevented access to testimony favorable to the accused.
Eason v. State, 65 Tenn. (6 Baxter) 431 (1873) (dictum).
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A few courts appear to approach the imposition of an affirmative duty in
stating that the trial judge has discretionary power to require the prosecutor
to call certain witnesses."' This position has been most fully developed in
Pennsylvania. The general rule in that state is that the district attorney has
discretion in calling witnesses subject to the general supervision of the trial
judge.13 Thus, the trial judge may compel the prosecutor to call a wit-
ness." 8 However, the potential power of the trial judge appears to have
been blunted by the holding that the prosecutor may withhold testimony if
he can establish any reason for withholding the testimony other than that
it is favorable to the accused.'39 For example, the prosecutor need only
allege that the witness' testimony would be unworthy of belief to relieve
himself of any duty.' In practice, the state supreme court requires no
more than that the prosecutor notify the defendant that he will not call the
witness so that the defendant may do so.' No case could be found revers-
ing a conviction for failure to call a witness. 4'
Though the statements of many of the courts which do not impose an
affirmative duty suggest that their views are not far removed from Michi-
136. United States v. Guertler, 147 F.2d 796 (2d Cir.) (court required prosecutor
to call; defendant complains on appeal), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 879 (1945); Common-
wealth v. Keller, 191 Pa. 122, 43 Ad. 198 (1899) ; State v. Payne, 10 Wash. 545, 39 Pac.
157 (1895); Dillon v. State, 137 Wis. 655, 119 N.W. 352 (1909).
137. E.g., Commonwealth v. Palermo, 368 Pa. 28, 81 A.2d 540 (1951); Common-
wealth v. Taraborelli, 202 Pa. Super. 356, 195 A.2d 888 (1963).
138. Commonwealth v. Zec, 262 Pa. 251, 105 At. 279 (1918); accord, Common-
wealth v. Keller, 191 Pa. 122, 43 Ad. 198 (1899); see Commonwealth v. Gockley, 411
Pa. 437, 192 A.2d 693 (1963); Donaldson v. Commonwealth, 95 Pa. 21 (1880);
Commonwealth v. Sarkis, 164 Pa. Super. 194, 63 A.2d 360 (1949). In such a case, the
prosecutor would be allowed to impeach the witness. Commonwealth v. Deitrick, 221
Pa. 7, 70 Atl. 275 (1908); cf. Commonwealth v. Sarkis, supra (not bound by the testi-
mony of such a witness).
139. Commonwealth v. Deitrick, supra note 138; see Commonwealth ex rel. Haines v.
Banmiller, 13 Pa. D. & C.2d 57 (C.P.), aff'd per curiam, 393 Pa. 439, 143 A.2d 661,
cert. denied, 358 U.S. 868 (1958).
140. E.g., Commonwealth v. Horn, 395 Pa. 585, 150 A.2d 872 (1959); Common-
wealth v. Francis, 201 Pa. Super. 313, 191 A.2d 884 (1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 985
(1964).
141. Commonwealth v. Horn, supra note 140; Commonwealth v. Deitrick, 221 Pa. 7,
70 At. 275 (1908); Commonwealth v. Danz, 211 Pa. 507, 60 At. 1070 (1905). Lower
court decisions add the further requirement, in dicta, that the prosecutor have the
witness in court. Commonwealth v. Cramer, 168 Pa. Super. 1, 76 A.2d 661 (1950);
Commonwealth v. Sarkis, 164 Pa. Super. 194, 63 A.2d 360 (1949).
142. In one case, the trial judge had required the calling of a witness. The court held
that this decision was not reviewable except for an abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v.
Sarkis, supra note 141. In another case, reversal followed a failure to produce, rather than
call, the witness. Commonwealth v. Cramer, supra note 141. See generally Note, 25
TEmP. L.Q. 344 (1952).
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gan's, the cases indicate that these courts simply do not reverse convictions
to require the calling of witnesses. In the few cases which did result in
reversals, the failure to call was only one of the factors which contributed
to the court's determination that the constitutional rights of the accused had
been violated.143
III. ATTEmPTS TO ESTABLISH CONSTITUTIONAL BASES FOR THE DUTY TO
CALL WITNESSES.
In recent years, defense attorneys have attempted to found the prosecu-
tor's duty to call witnesses on constitutional grounds through expansion of
the right of confrontation and the due process limits on suppression of
evidence.
A. The Right of Confrontation
While the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees
a defendant in a criminal trial the right to be confronted by the witnesses
against him, attempts to read into this right a duty on the part of the prose-
cutor to call certain witnesses have been uniformly unsuccessful."' The
claim has arisen in cases in which the witness in question was an informer,"'
was called by the prosecutor at a previous trial of the case but not at the
later trial, 4 ' was endorsed on the information or indictment,14 or was the
143. United States ex rel. Thompson v. Dye, 221 F.2d 763 (3d Cir. 1955); United
States ex rel. Montgomery v. Ragen, 86 F. Supp. 382 (N.D. Ill. 1949); People v. Riley,
191 Misc. 888, 83 N.Y.S.2d 281 (Kings County Ct. 1948); see United States v. Ramsey,
220 F. Supp. 86 (E.D. Tenn. 1963); Application of Kapatos, 208 F. Supp. 883 (S.D.N.Y.
1962). For a full discussion of these cases see notes 152-57 infra and accompanying text.
144. E.g., Eberhart v. United States, 262 F.2d 421 (9th Cir. 1958); Curtis v. Rives,
123 F.2d 936 (D.C. Cir. 1941); State v. Jordon, 83 Ariz. 248, 320 P.2d 446 (1958);
People v. Smith, 174 Cal. App. 2d 129, 344 P.2d 435 (Dist. Ct. App. 1959); People v.
Taylor, 159 Cal. App. 2d 752, 324 P.2d 715 (Dist. Ct. App. 1958); Denton v. State,
203 N.E.2d 539 (Ind. 1965); State v. Romero, 69 N.M. 187, 365 P.2d 58 (1961);
State ex rel. Byrd v. Bomar, 214 Tenn. 476, 381 S.W.2d 280 (1964).
145. Eberhart v. United States, supra note 144; People v. Smith, supra note 144;
People v. Taylor, supra note 144.
The Taylor case is the most striking example of the courts' unwillingness to extend the
doctrine. The informer there was given $10 by the police, searched thoroughly, then
closely watched as he entered and left the accused's car. He was again searched; the
money was missing and narcotics were found in his possession. The defendant was then
taken into custody. The case rested entirely on circumstantial evidence, since the
prosecutor did not call the informer. The court said the failure to call the informer was
not an infringement of the right to confrontation.
It is interesting to note that in Smith and in People v. Lollis, 177 Cal. App. 2d 665, 2
Cal. Rptr. 420 (Dist. Ct. App. 1960), the same informer is involved. In the Loth's case
the defendant secured two continuances in an attempt to find him.
146. Curtis v. Rives, 123 F.2d 936 (D.C. Cir. 1941) ; State v. Jordan, 83 Ariz. 248,
320 P.2d 446 (1958).
147. State v. Jordan, supra note 146; Greeson v. State, 97 Ga. App. 245, 102 S.E.2d
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victim. ' It would seem that the argument that the right of confrontation
requires that the witness be called has much force when the witness has
been endorsed as having appeared before the grand jury, or has played a
material role in gathering the evidence. In such a case, it is logical to as-
sume that his testimony played a part in the decision to return an indict-
ment or initiate prosecution. Thus, he has been, in a very real sense, a
witness against the accused, and the failure to call him could arguably deny
the accused the right to be confronted by him. However, the right to con-
frontation has been interpreted as essentially a safeguard against hearsay
evidence. It safeguards the right of cross-examination, but does not require
the calling of any particular witness.' 49 Apparently, confrontation does not
restrict the prosecutor's discretion in deciding what evidence he will use to
satisfy the burden of proving the accused's guilt except in restraining him
from using hearsay evidence. Consequently, the prosecutor may decide not
to introduce certain evidence and therefore will have no constitutional ob-
ligation to call the witness who possesses it.
Another argument for basing a duty to call on confrontation grounds
stems from United States Supreme Court decisions requiring that the prose-
cutor disclose the name of an informer who has played a material part in
gathering evidence against the accused."' 0 A number of California de-
cisions deal with attempts by the accused to enlarge this duty by interpreting
the right of confrontation as compelling the prosecutor to call the informer to
the stand.'51 These attempts have been uniformly unsuccessful.
503 (1958); Denton v. State, 203 N.E.2d 539 (Ind. 1965); Hood v. State, 80 Okla.
Crim. 175, 157 P.2d 918 (1945); State ex rel. Byrd v. Bomar, 214 Tenn. 476, 381
S.W.2d 280 (1964).
A charge by an accused that the failure of the prosecutor to call witnesses designated
as prosecution witnesses caused unfair surprise has also been rejected. See Robinson v.
United States, 128 F.2d 322 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
148. Commonwealth ex rel. Jones v. Myers, 201 Pa. Super. 437, 193 A.2d 629
(1963); see Curtis v. Rives, 123 F.2d 936 (D.C. Cir. 1941).
149. Curtis v. Rives, supra note 148; see State v. Jordan, 83 Ariz. 248, 320 P.2d 446
(1958).
150. See Rugendorf v. United States, 376 U.S. 528 (1964) ; Roviaro v. United States,
353 U.S. 53 (1957).
151. A detailed discussion of situations in which the prosecutor will be required to dis-
close the name of an informer is beyond the scope of this note. Therefore, no attempt is
made to determine whether the court was correct in requiring or refusing to require the
disclosure of the name of the informer in a given case. All attempts at extension of the
duty to require the calling of witnesses have met with failure. E.g., People v. Smith, 174
Cal. App. 2d 129, 344 P.2d 435 (Dist. Ct. App. 1959); People v. Alexander, 168 Cal.
App. 2d 753, 336 P.2d 565 (Dist. Ct. App. 1959).
In Smith, the court said that the rule requiring disclosure of the identity of the in-
formant was aimed at giving the accused an opportunity to uncover facts relating to the
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B. Due Process
Defendants have argued that a prosecutor's failure to disclose material
evidence and his concomitant failure to call a witness possesing such evi-
dence constitutes a denial of due process of law."5 2 In Application of
Kapatos.5. the prosecutor failed to disclose to the accused that an individual
had seen two men flee from the murder scene and that the individual would
testify that neither of the men was the accused. Similarly, in People v.
Riley"s4 the prosecutor failed to disclose the existence of or call an expert
handwriting witness who was prepared to testify that in his opinion an
allegedly forged signature was genuine. In both cases the convictions were
reversed because of the conduct of the prosecutor; however the duties im-
posed upon the prosecutor differed. In Kapatos the court would have been
satisfied with disclosure, but in the Riley case the New York court said that
the prosecutor should call the witness to the stand. "' Read in the light of
subsequent New York decisions,"5 ' it is arguable that no more would be re-
quired today than that the evidence be disclosed to the accused. The court is
less concerned with imposing a duty to call witnesses on the prosecutor than
with remedying a suppression of evidence. Aside from the Kapatos case,
Riley and the other cases in which suppression resulted from a failure to
disclose the existence of a witness or the evidence he could give involved
some reprehensible conduct in addition to the failure to call the witness to
the stand."5 7 The violation of due process, the suppression of evidence, may
informer's participation, permitting an independent investigation of the information given
to the officers by the informant and allowing the accused to interview, subpoena and call
the informant himself. People v. Smith, supra at 133, 344 P.2d at 438. Even requiring the
prosecutor to produce the informer has been held to be an unreasonable extension of the
rule. People v. Alexander, supra at 755, 336 P.2d at 566.
152. The question of whether the prosecutor must call a witness to the stand to avoid
a reversal for suppression of evidence is most clearly posed when the exculpatory
evidence is purely testimonial in character.
153. 208 F. Supp. 883 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
154. 191 Misc. 888, 83 N.Y.S.2d 281 (Kings County Ct. 1948).
155. People v. Riley, 191 Misc. 888, 83 N.Y.S.2d 281 (Kings County Ct. 1948) held
that it is the duty of the prosecutor to present to the trial jury all the material evidence of
which he may become possessed. Id. at 892, 83 N.Y.S.2d at 284; accord, People v.
Buckley, 44 Misc. 2d 403, 253 N.Y.S.2d 967 (Erie County Ct. 1964) (dictum).
156. People v. Fischer, 23 Misc. 2d 391, 192 N.Y.S.2d 741 (N.Y. County Ct. 1958);
People v. Hoffner, 208 Misc. 117, 129 N.Y.S.2d 833 (Queens County Ct. 1952). These
cases suggest that there is only a duty not to suppress evidence. This would seem to re-
quire no more than disclosure of the evidence to the accused.
157. United States ex tel. Thompson v. Dye, 221 F.2d 763 (3d Cir. 1955); United
States ex tel. Montgomery v. Ragen, 86 F. Supp. 382 (N.D. Ill. 1949); People v. Riley,
191 Misc. 888, 83 N.Y.S.2d 281 (Kings County Ct. 1948); see United States cx rel.
Almeida v. Baldi, 104 F. Supp. 321 (E.D. Pa. 1951), aff'd, 195 F.2d 815 (3d Cir. 1952),
cert. denied, 345 U.S. 904 (1953).
Washington University Open Scholarship
PROSECUTOR'S DUTY TO CALL WITNESSES
be rectified solely by the disclosure of the witness and the evidence that he
possesses without any imposition of duty to call.
Courts have generally been unwilling to impose a duty on the prosecutor
to call witnesses on constitutional grounds. Since the common law affirma-
tive duty is of long standing, and courts have long since taken stands on the
issue, it is unlikely that there will be any revolution of thinking. Therefore,
any possibility of extending the duty into states currently failing to recognize
an affirmative duty would seem to lie in the extent to which the courts are
willing to recognize an infringement of constitutional rights in the failure to
call a given witness to the stand.
CONCLUSION
While many courts,' the American Bar Association," 9 and legal
scholars' view the prosecutor as a minister of justice rather than a partisan
advocate, only a small minority of jurisdictions have imposed an affirmative
duty to call witnesses. The explanation seems to lie in a general reluctance
to disturb the fundamental adversary character of the criminal trial. The
courts apparently feel that some less drastic cure will satisfactorily deal with
the dangers of suppression and unfairness.
Is there a need or justification for imposing a duty on the prosecutor to-
day? The answer lies in striking a balance between insuring a fair trial to
the accused and enabling the prosecutor to secure conviction of the guilty.
Forcing the prosecutor to call witnesses whose testimony will be helpful to
the accused and presumably harmful to the prosecutor's case is a major
In the Riley case, the prosecutor told an expert handwriting witness to leave unseen by
the accused. In the Thompson case, the prosecutor failed to disclose the existence of or
call a police officer who would have testified that the accused appeared to be drunk, a fact
that presumably would have destroyed the intent necessary for first degree murder. The
failure was compounded by the prosecutor's statement in court that any further testimony
would be cumulative. In the Montgomery case, the prosecutor failed to call or disclose
the existence of a doctor who had examined the alleged victim of a rape and who would
have testified that no sexual assault took place. The prosecutor had also intimidated the
accused and his counsel so that an adequate defense had not been presented. In all of
these cases the emphasis was on the conduct of the prosecutor.
158. E.g., State v. Guilfoyle, 109 Conn. 124, 145 Atl. 761 (1929); Hurd v. People,
25 Mich. 405 (1872); State v. Smith, 78 Mlinn. 362, 81 N.W. 17 (1899); State v.
Eaton, 75 Mo. 586 (1882) ; State v. Magoon, 50 Vt. 333 (1877).
159. "The primary duty of a lawyer engaged in public prosecution is not to convict,
but to see that justice is done. The suppression of facts or the secreting of witnesses
capable of establishing the innocence of the accused is highly reprehensible." Canon 5,
ABA, CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS.
160. Wright, Duties of a Prosecutor, 33 CONN. B.J. 293 (1959); Humphreys, The
Duties of Prosecuting Counsel, 1955 Cram. L. REV. (Eng.) 739; Conboy, The Obligations
of a Prosecuting Attorney, 69 U.S.L. REv. 309 (1935).
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modification of the adversary system. It is submitted that such a duty should
not be imposed unless compelling reasons are found for doing so.
The major reasons cited by courts in forcing the prosecutor to call wit-
nesses are: (1) to avoid suppression or concealment of exculpatory evi-
dence, 6' and (2) to avoid the unfairness to the accused that may result if
he is forced to call a witness.162 This unfairness results from the procedural
and inherent handicaps that a litigant may face when he calls a witness.'
It is doubtful whether forcing the prosecutor to call a witness who pos-
sesses exculpatory evidence, without also requiring disclosure of the evi-
dence which the witness possesses, serves as any meaningful protection
against concealment or suppression of evidence." 4 However, even in cases
where the character of the witness would give notice of the evidence he
possessed, 6 5 it would appear that a disclosure both of the existence of the
witness and of the evidence he possessed would be a more adequate safe-
guard. The fields of disclosure and suppression are in a state of flux, and
some writers have expressed the opinion that the law is developing in the
direction of requiring the prosecutor to disclose all exculpatory evidence to
the accused.'66 Thus, it seems that the avoidance of concealment of evidence
is vanishing as a reason for the imposition of a duty to call witnesses.
161. People v. Tann, 326 Mich. 361, 40 N.W.2d 184 (1949); People v. Raider, 256
Mich. 131, 329 N.W. 387 (1931); People v. Kindra, 102 Mich. 147, 60 N.W. 458
(1894); see People v. Riley, 191 Misc. 888, 83 N.Y.S.2d 281 (Kings County Ct. 1948).
162. See Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 445 (1963) (concurring opinion);
United States v. Ramsey, 220 F. Supp. 86 (E.D. Tenn. 1963); People v. Raider, supra
note 161.
163. See notes 167-70 infra and accompanying text.
164. See People v. Ake, 362 Mich. 134, 106 N.W.2d 800 (1961). A deputy sheriff
was called to the stand by the prosecutor but the defendant failed to elicit the exculpa-
tory evidence he possessed because he was unaware of its existence. However, the court
reversed the conviction on grounds of newly discovered evidence. It is evident that without
this additional safeguard, the duty to call the witness to the stand would not have suffi-
ciently protected the accused against a concealment of evidence.
165. See People v. Riley, 191 Misc. 888, 83 N.Y.S.2d 281 (Kings County Ct. 1948).
The fact that the witness was a handwriting expert would presumably put the defense on
notice that he would be able to give expert testimony as to the authenticity of the
signature, the main issue in the case. If the defendant's counsel were not given adequate
time to determine the scope of the testimony that would be given by the witness and to
determine the advisability of calling the witness to the stand, he might prudently elect not
to do so, especially in light of the fact that the witness had been employed by the
prosecutor. A full disclosure of the testimony the witness would give would allow the
defense attorney to determine whether to call the witness or ask the court to call him.
166. Note, The Prosecutor's Constitutional Duty to Reveal Evidence to the Defen-
dant, 74 YALE L.J. 136 (1964); see Note, The Duty of the Prosecutor to Disclose Ex-
culpatory Evidence, 60 COLUM. L. REv. 858 (1960); Note, Discovery and Disclosure:
Dual Aspects of the Prosecutor's Role in Criminal Procedure, 34 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 92
(1965).
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Even though the defendant knows of the existence of a witness and the
evidence he can give, there may be situations where it would be funda-
mentally unfair to make him call the witness to the stand. The defendant
may be reluctant to call the witness if he is hostile, biased, or disreputable,
fearing either that the witness will lie or that his disreputable qualities will
open the door to an attack by the prosecutor which will reflect on the de-
fense's merit."' As one court observed, the most reputable persons are not
usually found at the scene of a crime."s Moreover, in calling the witness,
the accused faces several handicaps. He may be confronted by the common
law prohibition against impeaching his own witness, though this problem has
been modified somewhat by statutes and decisions.' While the trial judge
has the discretion to allow leading questions, this may be conditioned on the
ability of the defendant to show that the witness is hostile."'
On the other hand, the defendant gets the advantage of cross-examining
any witness called by the prosecutor.' He is allowed to ask leading ques-
tions,11 and to impeach the witness to show bias, self-interest, prior inconsis-
tent statements, or bad character."3  Moreover, the defendant not only
avoids the procedural disabilities discussed above, but may in fact succeed in
saddling the prosecutor with them.'74
In at least one type of case, this shifting of the procedural handicaps from
the defendant to the prosecutor seems fully justified. This is the case in
which a paid informer or special employee of the government has played a
material part in gathering evidence against the accused. A federal district
court reversed a conviction where the government failed to call such a wit-
ness when the defense interposed was entrapment. 7" Chief Justice Warren
167. See MCCORMICx, EVIDENCE § 33 (1954).
168. People v. Elco, 131 Mich. 519, 526, 94 N.W. 1069, 1074 (1903).
169. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 38 (1954). For a full discussion of the issues involved
here, see Note, 49 VA. L. Rv. 996 (1963).
170. McCoRmxcK, EVIDENCE § 6 (1954).
171. Id. § 19.
172. Id. § 20.
173. Id. § 33.
174. See State v. Guilfoyle, 109 Conn. 124, 145 At. 761 (1929). Unless court
decisions or statutes provide otherwise, the procedural incidents of calling a witness would
presumably fall upon the prosecutor in calling the witness to the stand. Michigan has, by
statute, removed any handicap the prosecutor would thus suffer. MICH. STAT. ANN. §
29.980(l) (1954).
175. United States v. Ramsey, 220 F. Supp. 86 (E.D. Tenn. 1963). The court
pointed out that the failure to call the witness, coupled with the fact that he had been un-
available in previous trials of other persons, raised an inference that the testimony was
being deliberately withheld. Id. at 89. In granting a new trial the court ordered the
prosecutor either to offer the informer as a witness or to assign reasons why this could not
be done. Id. at 90. The court relied heavily on Chief Justice Warren's concurring
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has pointed out that an informer is able to work effectively because of his
past criminal conduct and association with unsavory people."7 6 These traits
cause the accused and others to trust him, and these same characteristics
make the prosecutor unwilling to call him as a witness. If the accused is
forced to call the informer to get his testimony before the jury, or even if
the informer is called as a witness by the court, the government gets a
bonus. Not only has the prosecutor profited by the evidence the informer
has gathered, the Chief Justice points out, but he is able to attack the ac-
cused's case by impeaching the informer's credibility for bad character if
he gives any evidence helpful to the accused. 7 ' The unfairness of the
situation seems too obvious to belabor. Since it is the government which has
elected to use the informer, it is only fair that any onus resulting from doing
so should fall on the prosecutor, not the accused.""8 Aside from this narrow
opinion in Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 441 (1963), which criticized On Lee v.
United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952).
Federal courts have generally not adopted the view of the Ramsey case, that the
prosecutor should be compelled to call witnesses in this type of case to avoid unfairness to
the accused. E.g., United States v. D'Angiolillo, 340 F.2d 453 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
380 U.S. 955 (1965); United States v. Romano, 278 F.2d 202 (2d Cir. 1960); see United
States v. White, 344 F.2d 92 (4th Cir. 1965) (restricting Ramsey to entrapment cases).
But see United States ex rel. Drew v. Myers, 327 F.2d 174 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 379
U.S. 847 (1964); United States v. Clarke, 220 F. Supp. 905 (E.D. Pa. 1963). The
narcotics convictions of two doctors were reversed in the Clarke case and the government
was ordered to make reasonable efforts to produce (not call) the "special employee" at
the new trial. Observing that only a token effort had been made by the prosecutor to
produce the informer, the court said that, "candor compels us to note that Agent Cockerill
[the narcotics agent] seems to have experienced little difficulty in locating Flores [the
informer] when he needed his services as a 'special employee' a year earlier." Id. at
909. The defense in the case was entrapment.
176. Lopez v. United States, supra note 175, at 445.
177. Ibid. The Chief Justice points out that simply by refusing to call the informer,
the prosecutor places the "onus of finding and calling a disreputable witness" on the
accused and gains the ability to impeach the witness as a witness for the accused.
"The more disreputable the informer employed by the Government, the less likely the
accused will be to establish any questionable law enforcement methods used to convict
him." Ibid.
The Chief Justice contends that, practically speaking, this can bar the testimony of the
witness from ever coming to light because a good defense attorney will not take the risk of
calling him. This failure of the prosecutor to call the witness may in fact bar the accused
from raising any constitutional issues as to methods used in gathering evidence against
him. Presumably Chief Justice Warren bases this on his belief that a defense attorney will
be unwilling to take the risks of calling such a witness in order to probe these areas.
178. In many of the cases considered the informer was a regular "employee" of the
government. E.g., United States v. Clarke, 220 F. Supp. 905 (E.D. Pa. 1963); United
States v. Ramsey, 220 F. Supp 86 (E.D. Tenn 1963); People v. Smith, 174 Cal. App. 2d
129, 344 P.2d 435 (Dist. Ct. App. 1959). Presumably such a witness is either working for
pay or for some favorable treatment. Considering his position, it is doubtful he will be
helpful to the accused or antagonistic to his employer. The converse can be anticipated.
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area, 179 any solution aimed at relieving the defendant of the handicaps im-
plicit in calling a witness should avoid shifting them to the prosecutor.
If indeed the doctrines of disclosure and suppression are approaching the
point at which the prosecutor will have an affirmative duty to disclose all
exculpatory evidence to the accused, only the handicaps attendant to calling
a particular witness remain as justifications for the prosecutor's duty to call
witnesses to the stand. These handicaps can be grouped into two basic
difficulties: the absence of the tools available to a cross-examiner, and what
might be called the "guilt by association" possibilities inherent in calling
disreputable or unsavory persons to support one's case.
One alternative to imposing a duty to call on the prosecutor that would
bypass these stumbling blocks is to expand the use of court-called witnesses.
In the relatively few jurisdictions which have considered this method, 8 '
it seems well settled that the calling of any witness is left entirely to the dis-
cretion of the trial judge."' If a witness is called by the court, both the
prosecutor and the defendant may cross-examine and impeach him freely.'82
Since the accused did not have to call the witness himself, he cannot com-
plain that he was forced into a guilt by association situation. The cases
indicate that this device is presently used primarily by prosecutors who want
the jury to hear a certain witness's testimony, but are unwilling to vouch for
his reliability. 8 If trial judges are willing to accept the problems faced by
Therefore, the tools of cross-examination should be in the hands of the accused and not
the prosecutor.
179. There is little justification for placing the duty on the prosecutor to call an in-
former to the stand if he has done no more than supply information that leads to a
search and seizure, or even an arrest. If the informer is not a close relative or personal
friend of the accused, the issue of entrapment will not be involved. It is impossible to lay
down a formula which will draw a hard and fast line between this situation and one
such as was posed in United States v. Clarke, 220 F. Supp. 905 (E.D. Pa. 1963), or
United States v. Ramsey, 220 F. Supp. 86 (E.D. Tenn. 1963). In deciding a particular
case the court should consider the relationship between the informer and the accused and
the degree of participation by the informer in gathering the evidence against the accused,
including what role he has played in the commission of the crime for which the accused
is on trial. The court should also consider the past use of the particular informer's ser-
vices by the government, the extent to which he has been compensated for the work and
the type of compensation, i.e., favorable treatment or money, and whether or not
particular evidence is peculiarly within the knowledge of the informer. The absence or
presence of any one of these factors should not be controlling in itself.
180. See generally Annot., 67 A.L.R.2d 538 (1959).
181. E.g., United States v. Lutwak, 195 F.2d 748 (7th Cir. 1952), aff'd, 344 U.S.
604 (1953) ; Anderson v. State, 35 Ala. App. 111, 44 So. 2d 266 (1950) ; State v. Axilrod,
248 Minn. 204, 79 N.W.2d 677 (1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 938 (1957). But see
State v. Cain, 20 W. Va. 679 (1882).
182. Annot., 67 A.L.R.2d 538, 551, 553 (1959).
183. United States v. Lutwak, 195 F.2d 748 (7th Cir. 1952), aff'd, 344 U.S. 604
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defendants as sufficient reasons for calling some witnesses themselves, the
availability of the court-called witness device to defendants obviates any need
for imposing a duty to call on the prosecutor.
However, the decisions which have dealt with the above method, while
admitting its propriety, have warned that it should be employed very
sparingly.' This seems to be sound advice; the adversary nature of the
trial is again being tampered with, and the problem of preventing the at-
tachment of undue weight to a court-called witness's testimony is practically
insurmountable. Besides, a defendant would be faced with the same familiar
problems any time the judge denied his request to call a witness, and appel-
late reversals based on the failure of a trial judge to exercise his discretionary
power to call a witness are nonexistent.80
A better way of eliminating the defendant's handicaps while avoiding the
imposition of an affirmative duty to call on the prosecutor is at hand. The
common law rule against impeaching one's own witness could be discarded,
or at least the exceptions to it could be greatly liberalized."" This sensible
suggestion, which is supported by both Dean Ladda.r and Professor
Morgan' 8 and by some strongly worded federal court decisions,' has been
embodied in the Uniform Rules of Evidence.80 The objection to this alter-
native is that it leaves untouched the intangible guilt by association problem
faced by an accused, who may well be forced to call disreputable witnesses
to make out his defense. However, when any witness, disreputable or other-
wise, gives testimony favorable to the defendant, it seems likely that the jury
will look upon him as part of the defendant's case, whether he was actually
called to the stand by the defendant, the prosecutor, or the court.
(1953); Olive v. State, 131 Fla. 548, 179 So. 811 (1938); People v. Banks, 7 Ill. 2d 119,
129 N.E.2d 759, cert. denied, 351 U.S. 915 (1955); People v. Siciliano, 4 Il1. 2d 581, 123
N.E.2d 725, cert. denied, 349 U.S. 931 (1955); People v. Cardinelli, 297 Ill. 116, 130
N.E. 355 (1921).
184. Smith v. United States, 331 F.2d 265 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 824
(1964); United States v. Marzano, 149 F.2d 923 (2d Cir. 1945); City of Portales v.
Bell, 72 N.M. 80, 380 P.2d 826 (1963); Hill v. Commonwealth, 88 Va. 633, 14 S.E.
330 (1892); State v. Loveless, 142 W. Va. 809, 98 S.E.2d 773 (1957).
185. See, e.g., United States v. Lester, 248 F.2d 329 (2d Cir. 1957); Buchanan v.
State, 95 Fla. 301, 116 So. 275 (1928).
186. For a full discussion of the history and scope of this rule see Note, 49 VA. L.
REV. 996 (1963).
187. Ladd, Impeachment of One's Own Witness-New Developments, 4 U. CHi. L.
REV. 69, 96 (1936).
188. 1 MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 64-65 (1954).
189. United States v. Freeman, 302 F.2d 347 (2d Cir. 1962); London Guarantee &
Acc. Co. v. Woelfle, 83 F.2d 325 (8th Cir. 1936).
190. UNiFORm RULES OF EVIDENCE 20; see MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 106(1)
(1942).
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In summary, the utility of the duty to call witnesses is rapidly diminishing
in the face of developments in other areas of the law of criminal procedure.
Moreover, these related developments do not involve any fundamental
changes in the adversary system which may be attendant to the imposition
of a duty to call witnesses.
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